A Significant Municipal Budget Decision by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 2 
Number 2 Volume 2, May 1928, Number 2 Article 7 
June 2014 
A Significant Municipal Budget Decision 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1928) "A Significant Municipal Budget Decision," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 2 : No. 
2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
to support the Landers case.20 The Court looks with disfavor upon
requiring distant defendants to come to New York. 21
A more serious question is presented by the terminology of the
amendment which provides that the city court shall have "original
jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme court in actions for the recovery
of money only, etc." A superficial examination of the act and constitution
would tend to support the theory that the court's jurisdiction was now
co-extensive with that of the supreme court, subject only to its limited
power over the subject matter of the action. Here, also, the inefficient
drafting of the amendment and act is responsible. But the construction
placed upon this provision in the American Historical Society case seems
amply in point and decisive of the question: what was conferred was
jurisdiction similar to that of the supreme court in like actions limited
of course by the local character of the city court itself.
L. L. W.
A SIGNIFICANT MUNICIPAL BUDGET DECISION.-In October, 1927,
the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York
included in the budget an item of $13,000,000.00 "for the 1928 amortiza-
tion installment on Rapid Transit Corporate Stock-maturing 1929,
1930, 1931." 1
This action was taken pursuant to formal resolutions 2 previously
adopted by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment by virtue of their
20Hoag v. Lamont, 60 N. Y. 96 (1875); Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 497
(1878); Davidsburgh v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 529 (1882).
21Geraty v. Reid, supra note 13.
'Greater New York Charter, §206. "-For the redemption of such debt
out of said sinking fund there shall be annually included in the budget and
paid into the sinking fund of the City of New York herein created, an amount
to be estimated and certified by the comptroller, and to be by the - board
of estimate and apportionment inserted in the budget for each year,--";
Sec. 226, "-The said board shall annually - make a budget of the
amounts estimated to be required to pay expenses of--city-. In order
to enable said board to make such budget,--the heads of departments-
shall send to the board of estimate and apportionment an estimate ill
writing-."
2October 27, 1927. "Resolved, By the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment- pursuant to- requisitions of the Board of Transportation- that
the term of the corporate stock thereby authorized, to the extent of Fifty-
two million dollars, now unissued, shall be four (4) years from the date
of issue-";
Resolved, That the Board of Estimate and Apportionment hereby authorizes
the Comptroller of the City of New York to issue and sell, before December
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authority under the City Charter$ and the Rapid Transit Act.4 Insofar
as these resolutions specified the term and date of issue of the stock they
represented a departure from the usual, recognized practice of the
Board in such matters.
This attempted change in procedure res.ulted in an application being
made to the Supreme. Court at Special Term in the form of a motion
for a peremptory order of mandamus striking the amount from the
budget.5 The motion was granted and the judgment was atfirmed by the
Appellate Division upon the ground that the insertion of this item in the
budget was illegal in the absence of an estimate and certificate from
the Comptroller as a basis therefor6 This decision has been reversed
by the Court of Appeals.7
The opinion, written by Judge Pound, carefully recites and compares
the respective duties of the Board and the Comptroller. That it is the
duty of the latter to issue bonds when directed by the Board is admitted.,
but it is claimed that he has a discretion in determing- when to offer
them for sale and that before the Board can lawfully make provi.ion
in the budget for a reduction of the city's debt it must first receive a
certified estimate of the amount from the Comptroller.0 Appellant does
not attempt to overcome this argument by express denial, but contends.
and rightfully, that failure upon the part of the Comptroller to furni~.h
the information alleged to be essential to the validity of the Board's act
does not relieve it from the obligation to provide for the redemp-
tion of such debt.20 *To sustain this position it cites a numher of
31, 1927, corporate stock to the value of Fifty-two million dollars ($52,000.-
000.) being that portion of the above mentioned various authorizations, as
to which a term of four (4) years is hereinbefore fixed."
3Supra note 1, §§45, 206, 226.
4Rapid Transit Act, §37 (1) (L. 1891, chap. 4, as amended).
5New York Law Journal, Dec. 5, 1927.
8222 App. Div. 260 and see supra note 1. §§206, 229.
,People ex rel. Schieffel in v. Walker, et al., 247 N. Y. 320 (1928).
8Supra note 3. and note 7. at 324.
9Supra note 1, §206. Matter of City of N. Y., 218 N. Y. 274; 112 N.E.
911 (1916); People v. Flack. 216 N. Y. 123; 110 N.E. 167 (1915); Bull z.
Burton, 227 N. Y. 101; 124 N.E. 111 (1919); Matter of Cooper, 93 N. Y.
507 (1883); Schieffelin v. Hylan. 106 Misc. 347; 188 App. Div. 192; 227 N. Y.
593; 125 N.E. 925; 227 N. Y. 669; 126 N.E. 922 (1919); Bd. of County
Commrs. of St. Louis Co. v. Nettleton, 22 Minn. 356; Lancaster Co. v. City
of N. Y. 214 N. Y. 1; 108 N.E. 90 (1915) ; Merritt v. Village of Portchester
71 N. Y. 309 (1877); People v. City of Geneva, 98 App. Div. 383 (1904);
Hellwig v. City, 158 N. Y. Supp. 475 (1916); People ex rel. Dady v. Prender




cases,"1 all of which speak for a practical interpretation of various
statutes.
When the Legislature created the State Transit Commission, it
provided that the Board when so required by the Commission, should
appropriate such sum as the Commission might certify to be necessary
to enable it to perform its duties, and compliance with the demands of
that body was made mandatory.' 2 The Comnmission was empowered
to resort to the Appellate Division to enforce recognition of its re-
quirements.13
"Doutbless the Comptroller has, under the charter, in a general way,
a wide discretion as to when the bonds of the city shall be issued," but
this discretion is "subordinated to the duty to put the bonds on the
market before the date of their maturity." 14 Formulation of policies
is a proper function of the Board of Estimate and when it has decided
upon a definite course, it is not competent for the Comptroller to ques-
tion the wisdom of its action. It is his duty as an administrative officer,
to execute it.
The conduct of a municipal corporation is, like that of a private
corporation, regulated by statute and its activities must be confined to
such things as come within the scope of its charter. 15 Where the Legis-
lature in conferring power on the corporation to do a certain thing has
prescribed the method to be pursued in the exercise of that power, it
must as a general rule be followed.' 6 But, as already pointed out, the
Board is under compulsion to provide for the liquidation of the city's
debt, so that the instructions relating to the manner in which it is to
be done may be considered as merely directory.
There is an Appellate Division decision holding that the matters
in the budget and their readjustment are exclusively within the juris-
"'Grimmer v. Tenement House Dept 205 N. Y. 549; 98 N.E. 332 (1912);
People ex rel. Werner v. Prendergast, 206 N. Y. 405; 99 N.E. 1047 (1912);
Wintersteen v. City, 220 N.Y. 57; 115 N.E. 17 (1917); Matter of City of
N. Y. 217 N. Y. 1; 111 N.E. 256 (1916); City v. N. Y. City 1. Co., 193
N. Y. 543; 86 N.E. 565; People exr rel. Metropolitan Life v. Knapp 193 App.
Div,. 413 (1920); People v. Karr, 240 N. Y. 348 (1925); Reformed Church
v. M. A. Bldg. Co., 214 N. Y. 268; 108 N.E. 444 (1915); People ex rel.
Snyder v. Hylan, 212 N. Y. 236; 106 N.E. 89 (1914); Litchfield Construction
Co. v. City of N. Y., 244 N. Y. 251; 155 N.E. 116 (1926).
12Supra note 3, §45, and note 4.
'$Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 390; 134 N.E.
187 (1922); See also Matter of College of City of N. Y. v. Hylan, 205 App.
Div. 372, 199 N. Y. Supp. 804, affd, 236 N. Y. 594; 142 N.E. 297 (1923).
14Supra note 7 at p. 330.
"5City of Bi.ffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258; 100 N.E. 798 (1913).
26Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; 25 N.E. 480 (1890).
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diction of the administrative powers of the city, and the courts have no
power to interfere, or supervise their action by mandamus.17 However
exercise of the power conferred on the Board in that case was discre-
tionary. The action of the Board has been subjected to review by the
use of this remedy, many times. We have, for example, an order com-
pelling the Board to provide an amount requested for salaries of court
attendants appointed by justices of the Supreme Court.' 8 The Board,
in opposing the application, stated to the court that the amount of the
budget would exceed the limit allowed by the Constitution, but the court
refused to allow this defense because the Board has the power to reduce
discretionary items. And in another case 10 the Board was forced to
yield to a demand for the payment. of the expense of improving lands
and for salaries of commissioners of the Bronx Park Commission.
For a proper determination of the distribution of power between
the Board and the Comptroller, it is necessary to have recourse to the
City Charter. Repeated references are made to it by the court and the
necessity of reading all of the applicable sections as an entirety cannot
be too strongly emphasized. A different analysis would make the ques-
tion complex and extremely difficult of determination. The court is
careful to note that they "are not to be read as disconnected and inde-
pendent provisions of law," but to be construed, if possible "as a
harmonious whole, providing a practical and consistent scheme of
municipal administration in connection with the construction of the
subways."2 o
When we apply this test, the conclusion is inevitable, that the
Comptroller is, as to the matter in controversy, the source of information
rather than the authority for the necessary items. The power of the
Board to insert a proper amortization item in the 1928 budget does not
depend on the concurrence or approval of any other board or public
body. Its inclusion "was, therefore, proper in anticipation of the issue
of the bonds by the Comptroller." 2 '
The decision is further evidence of the growing tendency of the Court
to dispose of questions upon the actual merits of the controversy without
"lPeople ex rel. Kelly v. Dooley, 169 App. Div. 423, 155 N. Y. Supp. 326
(1915).
'sPeople ex rel. Cropsey v. Hylan, 199 App. Div. 218, 191 N. Y. Supp. 195,
aF'd 232 N. Y. 601, 134 N.E. 588 (1921); followed in Same ex rel. Eidt v.
Same, 199 App. Div. 965, 191 N. Y. Supp. 945, aff'd 232 N. Y. 602; 134 N.E.
589 (1921).
'
0 Bronx Parkway Comm. v. Hylan, 119 Misc. 785, 198 N. Y. Supp. 271,
aff'd 206 App. Div. 688. 200 M. Y. 'Supp. 915, affd 236 N. Y. 593; 142 N.E.
297 (1922).
2 Supra note 7 at p. 327.
2-Jbid. 331.
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over regard for rules merely technical or procedural. -From the very
structure of our local government it is apparent that dissension among
individual office-holders could, if unchecked, lead to greaf public incon-
venience. Those who have from time to time participated in the
formulation of our system of municipal regulation have, it would seem,
laid their plans in the assumption that the requisite co-operation would,
at all times, be forthcoming. That the-Court has, in the instant case,
taken a hand in obviating a difficulty, technical at best, is worthy of
commendation.
J. A. M.
RACIAL SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: GONG LUM V.
RtcF..'-A young Chinese girl of good moral character is denied the
privilege of attending the public high school maintained for the district
in which she resides with her parents, upon the sole ground that she is
of Chinese descent and not a member of the white or Caucasian race,
although her father is a taxpayer helping to support the school. The
petition alleges undue discrimination against the girl by the Board of
Trustees of the school. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had held that
since their state constitution provided that "Separate schools shall be
maintained for children of the white and colored races," there was a
consequent division of the educable children into those of the pure white
or Caucasian race on the one hand, and the brown, yellow and black on
the other; that the legislature is not compelled to provide schools for
each of the colored races; that a colored public school exists in every
county, in which every colored child is entitled to obtain an education;
and that if the plaintiff desires, she may attend the colored school of her
district or go to a private school
This was attacked as unconstitutional on the theory that a state can-
not be said to afford a child of Chinese ancestry, born in this country
and a citizen of the United States, the equal protection of the lavs by
giving her the opportunity for education in a school which receives only
colored children of the brown, yellow or black races. Unfortunately,
the plaintiff did not allege in her petition that she would be subject to
great inconvenience in being compelled to travel a greater distance were
she to attend the colored school, and the Court did not consider the point.
ft (lid intimate vaguely that, under those circumstances, a different ques-
tion might have been .6resented, but whether or not that would change
the ruling is very doubtful from the tenor of the decision.
In expressing the opinion of the Supreme Court, Chief .Justice Taft
held that any citizen not of the white or Caucasian race. may be classed
1275 U. S. 78 (1927).
